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Abstract 
A number of writers (Joseph Halpern and Fahiem 
Bacchus among them) have offered semantics for 
formal languages in which inferences concerning 
probabilities can be made. Our concern is differ­
ent This paper provides a formalization of non­
monotonic inferences in which the conclusion is 
supported only to a certain degree. Such infer­
ences are clearly 'invalid' since they must allow 
the falsity of a conclusion even when the 
premises are true. Nevertheless, such inferences 
can be characterized both syntactically and seman­
tically. The 'premises' of probabilistic argu­
ments are sets of statements (as in a database or 
knowledge base); the conclusions categorical 
statements in the language. We provide standards 
for both this form of inference, for which high 
probability is required, and for an inference in 
which the conclusion is qualified by an interme­
diate interval of support. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic reasoning, and probabilistic argument, as we 
are concerned with them here, are reasoning and argument 
in which the object is to establish the credibility, or ac­
ceptability, or probability, of a conclusion on the basis of 
an argument from premises that to not entail that conclu­
sion. Other terms for the process: inductive reasoning, 
scientific reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning. What we 
seek to characterize is that form of argument that will lead 
to conclusions that may, on the basis of new evidence, be 
withdrawn. 
What is explicitly excluded from probabilistic reasoning, 
in the sense under discussion, is reasoning from one prob­
ability statement to another. Genesereth and Nilsson 
( I  987), for example, offer as an example of their 
"probabilistic logic" the way in which constraints on the 
probability of Q can be established on the basis of proba­
bilities for P and for P => Q. This is not what we are 
concerned with. We are concerned with the argument from 
a set of sentences r to a particular sentence .p, where that 
argument is not deductive: that is, the case in which r 
does not entail .p. Arguments of this sort have been con­
sidered at length in philosophy, but no consensus regard­
ing their treatment has emerged. 
We will offer below a logic governing (or representing) 
such inferences, together with a semantics that will pro­
vide some motivation for the adoption of that logic. 
It should be noted that inference of the sort in question is 
not truth preserving. Thus we do not want to apply con­
ventional semantics directly: we are not concerned with 
the characterization of some form of truth preserving in­
ference. (Note that inference within the framework of the 
probability calculus (from P(A) = p and P(B) = q to infer 
P(A v B) � p + q) is truth preserving.) We are concerned 
with inference from r to .p, where r does not entail .p, 
but in some sense justifies it 
One argument undermining this effort is the argument that 
such inference is "subjective." We will take for granted, 
but also attempt to illustrate, that inconclusive arguments 
can be just as objective as conclusive arguments, and thus 
that inductive, probabilistic, uncertain argument as much 
admits of characterization in semantic terms as does deduc­
tive argument. 
2. DEPARTURES FROM 
CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS 
There are a number of ways in which we must diverge 
from conventional logical analysis. 
First, the most obvious difference is that our inference 
procedures must be non-monotonic. If a body of evidence 
r does not entail that cjl, then clearly further evidence 
could undermine whatever support r does lend to ¢1. 
Second, this form of inference is not truth-preserving. It 
is quite possible that all the sentences in r should be 
true, while 4> should be false. 
Third, we should not expect that this kind of inference 
should be "consistent" in the sense that the collection of 
conclusions supported should have a model: we have in 
mind not only the lottery paradox, but the theory of mea­
surement, in which we should accept what is overwhelm­
ingly probable in any particular case, but at the same time 
be sure that in the long run, we will accept something 
that is false. 
Fourth, while logic is impotent in the face of inconsistent 
premises, we would hope that inductive inference could 
tolerate inconsistent inputs. 
Finally, we should expect that the difference between in­
puts or premises consisting of a collection of sentences 
and that consisting of a single (conjunctive) sentence 
might be relevant. 
3 IMPLICATION AND INDUCTIVE 
VALIDITY 
Conventional wisdom regarding inference is that A im­
plies B is true just in case B is true in every model in 
which A is true. More generally, the set of sentences r 
implies c1> just in case ¢1 is true in every model in which 
the sentences of rare true. 
A natural generalization of this wisdom might be to de­
mand that an inductive inference is valid in case almost all 
of the models in which r is true are models in which ¢1 is 
true. Even better, if we wish to allow for data that is not 
strictly consistent: we might demand that cj> be true in al­
most all of the models in which any consistent subset of 
r is true. Explicitly, we might say that cj> is a valid in­
ductive consequence of r just in case ¢1 is true in almost 
all of the models corresponding to each of the maximal 
consistent subsets r· of r. Even this won't quite do. So 
we will say that an inductive inference is valid just in case 
the conclusion is true in almost all of the models of each 
set of models picked out by a selection function that, for 
every maximal consistent subset of r, picks out a set of 
models. We will characterize this function as we go 
along. 
4 SYNTAX 
We begin with a standard first order language. We allow 
for names, functions, predicates of any -arity. The proof­
theoretic relation we are concerned with is r I= (p,q) ¢1, 
which says that ¢1 is 'implied' to the degree (p,q) by the 
premises (evidence, body of knowledge) r. The "implies" 
relation will be represented by a model theoretic relation 
as just described: ¢1 must be true in a fraction of the mod­
els that is at least p, and at most q among each of the sets 
of models picked out For inductive logic we may settle 
for "at least p," but for generality we may well be advised 
to keep track of the upper limit as well. 
We adopt the technique used by both Halpern (1990) and 
Bacchus (1991) of using a two-sorted language, with sepa­
rate variables for objects and for 'field' terms, intended to 
be interpreted as real numbers. We include the constants 0 
and 1, and the standard operations and relations for real 
numbers. We include a countable set T of canonical terms 
representing real numbers between 0 and 1, inclusive (for 
example decimals). The only syntactic novelty in the 
language is the inclusion of a primitive relation that con­
nects formulas and real numbers, '%(cp,¢l,p,q)," which 
says roughly that the proportion of objects satisfying the 
open formula ¢1, that also satisfy the open formula cp is 
between p and q, inclusive. 
5 SEMANTICS 
A model of our language is exactly the usual sort of 
thing, a pair (D, '!}) where D is a domain of individuals, 
which we constrain to be finite, and '!} is an interpretation 
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function. ('The field terms take their values in the domain 
of the reals, and the relations and functions applicable to 
field terms have their standard interpretations.) The inter­
pretation function maps individual constants onto mem­
bers of D, predicates onto subsets of D, n-termed relations 
onto nn, function terms onto functions from nn to D, 
etc. The only oddity, for such a rich language, is that we 
shall take D to be finite (though we need not give its car­
dinality an upper bound). 
Truth is defined relative to a model and a variable assign­
ment, (M, v). The only novelty here is the procedure for 
assigning truth to the special statistical statements of the 
form "%(cp,¢l,p,q)." 
The satisfaction set of an open formula cj>, relative to a 
model M = (D, '!}), is the subset of nn which 1'} makes ¢1 
true, where n is the number of variables free in ¢1. In par­
ticular, if ¢1 is a formula containing n free variables (xi, 
X2, .. . xn). then the satisfaction set of ¢1 is the set of n­
tuples of D such that 
(M. �,, ... a.) I= "' x,, . .  .x. '!' 
If ¢1 is a predicate followed by n variables, the satisfaction 
set of cj> is just its interpretation in M. If ¢1 is a predicate 
followed by k terms, the satisfaction set of ¢1 is the set of 
objects (a1, a2, ... an) E n
n such that the assignment of 
those objects to variables of ¢1 render ¢1 true. (Thus 
S(B(x,a)) could be the set of individuals in D who are 
smart ('S') brothers ('B') of a.) If ¢1 and cp contain exactly 
the same free variables, the satisfaction set of 'cp " ¢1' is 
the intersection of the satisfaction sets of cp and of ¢1. If ¢1 
contains n free variables, the satisfaction set of '--, ¢1' is the 
complement of the satisfaction set of ¢1 in nn . Since the 
satisfaction set of an open formula ¢1 depends only on the 
domain and the interpretation function 1'}, we will denote 
it by 'l}(cp). 
We say that "%(cp,<jl,p,q)," is true in (M, v), if and only 
if 
(i) p and q are field variables or members of T, the 
set of canonical terms, 
(ii) q> and ¢1 are open formulas, and the ratio of the 
cardinality of the satisfaction set assigned by '6 to 'cp" 
¢1' to the cardinality of the satisfaction set assigned by '!} 
to ¢1 is between the real number assigned by (M, v) top 
and the real number assigned by (M. v) to q. (If no ob­
jects are assigned by'!} to ¢1, then the formula is to be re­
garded as true if p = O,and false otherwise: %(cp,¢l,p,q) = 
l'l}(<!l)l*p � 110 Y 01 �IJ(f)l*q.l) 
"%"is thus a general variable binding operator, and repre­
sents something like relative frequency in the (finite) 
1 We could achieve greater elegance and generality by 
incorporating the features of Popper functions in our 
interpretation. The costs, relative to the benefits, seem 
excessive. 
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model under consideration. If p or q are field variables, 
then the truth of a statistical statement in which they oc­
cur depends on the variable assignment; otherwise (since 
otherwise they are real number terms in canonical form) 
they do not. 
Examples: "%(R(x,y),Q(x,y),p,q)" is true in a model just 
in case in that model the proportion of pairs satisfying 
"R(x,y)&Q(x,y)", among the pairs satisfying"Q(x,y)" is 
in the interval [p,q]. 
"%(R(x,y),Q(w,y),p,q)" is true in a model just in case in 
that model  the proportion triples satisfying 
"R(x,y)&Q(w,y)" among the pairs satisfying "Q(w,y)" is 
in [p,q]. (There can't be any!) 
"%(R(x,y),Q(w,v),p,q)" is true in a model just in case in 
that model the proportion of quadruples satisfying 
"R(x,y)&Q(w,v)" among the pairs satisfying "Q(w,v)" is 
in [p,q], namely, none. 
"%(R(x,y),Q(F(x),G(x,y)),p,q)" is true in a model just in 
case in that model the proportion of pairs <x,y> such that 
the F of x and the G of the pair <x,y> stand in the rela­
tion Q, are also such that they (x and y) satisfy R, lies be­
tween p and q. 
We now have truth defined for all the sentences of our 
formal language relative to models and variable assign­
ments having a fmite object domain D. 
6 PROBABILISTIC SOUNDNESS 
While soundness for valid deductive inference consists in 
the fact that the conclusion is true in every model in 
which the premises are true, probabilistic soundness must 
meet a weaker condition. As pointed out above, the con­
ditions for inductive validity are not quite a simple weak­
ening, but we will start by requiring that a valid inductive 
(or uncertain) inference of force [p,q] be characterized by 
the fact that of the models in which the premises are true, 
between p and q are such that the conclusion is true. 
This doesn't seem much like inference, but if we think of 
pas a number close to 1, and disregard q, validity in this 
sense seems like an appropriate standard of inductive ac­
ceptance. We will, however, continue to treat the ques­
tion generally, i.e., define validity relative to an interval 
[p,q], where p and q are field terms, and not variables. 
The first thing that falls out of this approach is that 
statements known to be equivalent will receive the same 
(interval) degree of support: 
T-1 If 'ell= q�' is in r, then r t= (p,q) ell if and only 
if r � (p,q) <p • 
If the biconditional is in the set of premises, any model 
that makes the premises true will either make both c:p and 
ell true, or neither true. This is so, even if there is a selec­
tion function that picks a subset of this set of models. 
Thus the proportion of models that make the premises 
true that also make the conclusion will be the same in ei­
ther case. 
7 PREMISES 
Before we go further, we must give some thought tor. 
What we have in mind is a set of sentences representing a 
body of knowledge or a database. Typically it will be 
large. Typically it will have both sentences of the form 
'P(a)' attributing a property to an object, and sentences of 
the form '%(<p,$,p,q)' constraining the proportion of ob­
jects having one property, among those that have another 
property. It may also have sentences of other forms, but 
it is sentences of these two forms, together with bicondi­
tionals, that will mainly concern us. We should not think 
of r as a  deductively closed set of sentences. It will be 
better to think of r as a  finite set of sentences given ex­
plicitly; for example, as axioms. For the time being we 
will assume that this set of sentences is simultaneously 
satisfiable by at least one model, but later we will lift that 
restriction to show that probabilistic inference does not 
(always) break down in the face of inconsistency in the 
database. 
Although r should be thought of as finite, and not deduc­
tively closed, we will still assume that any logically or 
mathematically valid formula can be added to it. What 
this means, of course, is that when a statement is shown 
to be valid, we are justified in adding it to r. 
8 NUMBERS OF MODELS 
Suppose that r consists of the two sentences, 
"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)" and "B(a)." Then the number of mod­
els in which "%(A(x),B(x),p,q)" is true can be calculated 
for D of given size; it is merely a combinatorial problem 
to calculate the number of ways in which IDI objects can 
be assigned to four boxes, AB, A -,8, --.AB, and -,A -,8 in 
such a way that IABI/lBilies in [p,q]. In that set of mod­
els, we pick out the subset in which "B(a)" is true. But 
without even knowing the number of models satisfying 
the premises, we can be quite sure than between p and q of 
them also satisfy "A(a)," since the term a may denote any 
of the objects in the box B. It follows that: 
T-2 ("%(A(x),B(x),p,q)", "B(a)"} I= (p,q) "A(a)." 
If p is large enough, say greater than some selected ratio 1 
- o, then we may accept "A(a)" on the basis of the total 
evidence {"%(A(x),B(x),p,q),"B(a)"). Clearly, if we know 
more than this, the inference may be undermined. But so 
may the assignment of probability in T -2. This form of 
argument is clearly non-monotonic. 
This is not e-semantics2: we intend o to be a fixed real 
number, chosen according to the demands of the context. 3 
2 Geffer and Pearl (1990), Pearl (1988). 
3 Some suggestions concerning how the level of 
acceptance might be chosen were given in (Kyburg, 
1988). 
We do not demand that the chance of a mistake be reduced 
to an arbitrarily low level, but only that it be reduced to 
less than�-
9 SPECIFICITY 
A natural constraint on uncertain or probabilistic infer­
ence, well known since Reichenbach4, is that given a 
choice between two reference classes for a probability. if 
we know one is a subclass of the other it is a better guide 
to belief. In the theory of evidential probability (Kyburg 
1991a), the included class is also to be preferred. In other 
contexts 'specificity' is also deemed appropriate 
(Touretzky 1986). 
Suppose that we add "B'(a)," "Vx(B'(x) � B (x)," and 
"%(A(x),B' (x),p' ,q')" to our previous database, where p 
<p' & q < q' or p >p' & q > q'. Then we should expect 
that the proportion of models in which the premises are 
true would be between p' and q'. Indeed, this is so, for the 
set of models in which "B' (a)" is satisfied will be con­
strained to be a subset of the set of models in which 
"B(a)" is satisfied, and in that subset, by the same argu­
ment as before, the proportion of models in which "A(a)" 
is satisfied will be between p' and q'. 
T-3 If p <p' & q < q' or p >p' & q > q' , then 
{"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)" ,"B(a)" "B' (a)," "'Vx(B(x) IE B' (x)," 
"%(A(x),B'(x),p' ,q')"} P (p,q) "A(a)." 
As indicated in Kyburg (1991b), 'specificity' is only one 
among three quite different circumstances under which one 
statistical inference structure dominates another. The 
other two (and, we claim, there are only two others) are 
the structure which takes account of known prior distribu­
tions (the 'Bayesian' relation) and the structure which cor­
responds to having more data (the 'subsample' relation). 
We will explore the model-theoretic explanation for these 
forms of domination in another place. 
10 STRENGTH 
One of the more controversial features of evidential proba­
bility is the 'strength principle'. According to this prin­
ciple, the fact that I know an applicant for insurance is a 
Mormon does not prevent a broader reference class from 
being appropriate for determining his premium, unless I 
also know that the relevant death rate is different among 
Mormons. To know that the death rate is different is to 
be construed as in the preceding theorem, that is, as know­
ing p <p' & q < q' or p >p' & q > q'. (Since p, q ,  etc., 
are field terms and not variables, to know this requires 
only the comparison of fractions in canonical form.) 
Suppose that what we know is that p' :s; p & q :s; q'. 
Then we know both that in the set of models in which 
"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)'' and "B(a)" are true "A(a)" is true in be­
tween p and q of them, and also that in the set of models 
4 Hans Reichenbach,: The Theory of Probability, 
University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1949. (German ed. 1934.) 
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in which "%(A(x),B(x),p,q)" ,"B(a)" "B'(a)", "Vx(B(x)--+ 
B' (x)" and "%(A(x),B'(x),p' ,q')" are all true, between p' 
and q' are models in which "A( a)" is also true. But we al­
ready knew that Adding the new sentences doesn't change 
the force of the probabilistic argument so much as it 
weakens it. We can capture this insight semantically by 
saying that the combined evidence picks out a subset of 
models satisfying not only the constraint embodied in 
"V x(B(x) --+ B' (x)", and the constraint embodied in 
"%(A(x),B'(x),p' ,q')", but also, in view of the lack of con­
f l i c t  b e t w e e n  " % (A ( x ),B (x),p , q ) "  and 
" % ( A (x ),B'( x ),p ',q ' )" ,  having a p roportion 
[�(A)n�(B')]/�{B') that lies between p and q, rather than 
merely between p' and q'. Clearly this is always possi­
ble.S This is an operation of the selection function: the 
premises (r) pick out a set of models in which the 
premises are all true; the selection principle picks out a 
further subset, corresponding to the fact that the additional 
constraint (to models in which "B' (a)" is true) does not add 
to our evidence concerning "A(a)". 
It is important to note that we are not assuming that 
"%(A(x),B'(x),p,q)" should be added to our database, but 
only that the measure of support or degree of implication 
of "A(a)" given by our database is determined by the set of 
models in which that statement would be true. 
T� If p' :s;p&q:s; q',then 
{"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)" ,"B(a)" "B' (a)," "Vx(B(x) � B' (x)," 
"%(A(x),B'(x),p' ,q')" } P (p,q) "A(a)." 
11 CONFLICTING EVIDENCE 
Suppose that we know that a has both the properties B 
and B', and that the statistics we have differ, as in T-3, 
but that we do not know that B is included in B' , or vice 
versa The models of {"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)", "B(a)", "B'(a)", 
"%(A(x),B'(x),p',q')",B'(a)J differ in the proportion of 
A's among B's and among B' 's. We have conflicting evi­
dence. The selection function picks out a set of models 
concerning which the statistical premises of r agree: 
namely, those in which both [�(A)n�(B )]/�(B) and 
[�(A)n�(B')]/�(B') are bounded only by min(p,p') and 
max(q,q'). This is a larger set of models, rather than a 
smaller one, but in this set there is no conflict between B 
and B'. 
T-5 If p <p' & q < q' or p >p' & q > q' , then 
{"%(A(x),B(x),p,q)", "B(a)", "B' (a)", 
"%(A(x),B' (x),p' ,q')" ,  B' (x)} P (min(p,p'),max(q,q')) 
"A(a)." 
12 THE GENERAL CASE 
5 The same idea will be found in Bacchus (1990), 
employed qualitatively to deal with 'overly specific 
reference classes' (p. 162): if we have no information, 
then we may assume that the measure in the subset is 
the same as that in the superset. We are here not 
making this (generally unwarranted) assumption. 
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Note that each of these theorems, we are taking the listed 
members of r to be the only members of r. None of 
these theorems thus reflect more than ideally impoverished 
bodies of knowledge that cannot be taken very seriously. 
In any realistic situation, we must take account of far 
richer background knowledge. A variety of syntactical 
work has been done (Kyburg 1961, Kyburg and 
Murtezaoglu 1991, Loui 1 988) with the object of provid­
ing rules and algorithms for implementing this notion of 
inductive support, where the contents of the premise set is 
plausibly rich. 
There appears to be no reason not to suppose that the se­
mantics for the richer cases cannot be worked through. In 
general there are a number of possible ways of deriving a 
probability for a statement, some of which involve 
stronger statistical statements than others, some of which 
involve differing statistical statements, and various rela­
tions may be known among the potential references 
classes. By T-1 ,  all these differences must be resolved. 
Additions to the selection function are required to deal 
with two further extremely important cases in which G 
embodies conflicting evidence: the case in which taking 
account of known prior distributions is important, and the 
general case of statistical inference. These have been al­
luded to elsewhere (Kyburg, 199Ib), and will not further 
occupy us here. 
13 INCONSISTENCY 
Let us now tum to the case in which r is inconsistent, 
i.e., has no model. How can inductive inference be possi­
ble? A maximal consistent subset of the finite set r is a 
set of sentences, each of which belongs to r, and which is 
such that if any other sentence of r is added to it, incon­
sistency results. Let us suppose we have r· l=(p,q) cj> 
for every maximal consistent subset r· of r. Then we 
should have: 
T-6 If r• l=(p,q) cj> for every maximal consistent sub­
set r· of r. then r P(p,q) q,. 
A familiar example in which this would make sense is the 
following: let r contain a description of the million 
ticket lottery, and, for every i from I to a million, the 
sentence "-,W(ti)". Let it also contain "%(H ,T,.49,.51 )" 
and "T(a)", where Tis the predicate "-is a toss of a coin" 
and H is the predicate "-lands heads up". If we assume 
that description of the lottery says that there is one win­
ner, then there is no model of this set of sentences. 
Intuitively there is no reason why we should not be able 
to infer, with confidence [.49,.51], that "H(a)". And in­
deed, T -6 leads to this resull 
On the other hand, we cannot infer anything interesting 
about "-,W(tJ)". There are models (those in which f}(t I) 
is a member of 't'}(W)) in which "-,W(tJ)" is false, and in 
all of those models "W(q)" is true, so that r t=(l,l) 
"W(q)". There are also a lot of models in which 
"-,W(IJY' is true, so that r 1=(0,0) "W(tJ)". Thus, rela-
tive to the database r. there is no probability that ticket t} 
will lose, and in particular no high probability that it will 
lose. 
We may state this as T-7: 
T-7 It is possible that cj> E r, while r l=(p,q) cj> is 
false for all p and q, and thus that f may not be inductively 
inferred from rat any level of confidence. 
On the other hand, if r is consistent, and q, e r, 
then r 1==(1 ,1 ) cj>, as may be seen thus: if cj) E rand r is 
consistent, then every sentence in r holds in every model 
of r - we only tum to maximal consistent subsets of r 
when r has no model. But then cj) is true in every model 
of rand therefore in every selected model of r. Thus, 
T-8 Ifrhasa model andcj)e f,thenr l==(l,l)cj). 
This insulation from the effects of inconsistency makes 
probabilistic logic as construed here seem an interesting 
alternative to ordinary ftrst order logic. Settle on a value 
foro, and accept as inductively justified any statement 
whose lower probability, relative to the database r, ex­
ceeds 1 - o. The resulting set of inductively justified sen­
tences will include the logical and mathematical truths in 
r. It may be inconsistent (for example if r contains a de­
scription of the lottery), but it will not inherit inconsis­
tencies from r. We conjecture that there may be a gain in 
computational efficiency in taking probabilistic logic as 
the basic logic for making inferences from r. 
14 RELATION TO OTHER WORK 
Charles Morgan (1991) has examined an approach to 
founding various logics on probabilistic principles. He 
describes a variety of logics in probabilistic terms (and 
even provides a handy recipe for generating them!), but 
since he takes a conditional probability of 1 (relative to a 
condition whose probability is non-0) to correspond to va­
lidity, it is clear that his probabilistic logic differs from 
the one offered here. The contrast can be rendered stark by 
considering four principles Morgan lays down as basic to 
his enterprise:6 
R.l. If A e r then r I- A. 
R.2. If r 1- A then for some finite subset 
6. of r. 6. 1- A. 
1- B. 
R.3. If r u {A } 1- Band r 1- A, then r 
R.4. ur 1- A then r u 6. 1- A. 
If the syntax developed elsewhere is adequate to the seman­
tics given here, we may interpret the turnstile as follows: 
r1- A just in case r F(l-o,q) A, for given o and arbitrary 
9. We have just seen that R.l. does not hold for our no­
tion of inductive or probabilistic inference, unless r is 
strictly consistent. R.2. holds, since our models are all 
finite. R.3. may fail to hold for an interesting reason. 
6 p. 98. 
Let r contain "T(a)" and a large amount of statistical data 
concerning TandB. LetA be "%(T(x),B(x),1-o,1)". By 
T-2 we see that r u {A) F(l-8,1) "T(a)". It is possible 
to show, assuming suitable statistical data is in r, that 
"%(T(x).B(x),I-d,1)" may be a conclusion that can be 
validly (inductively) inferred from r, i.e, we can have r 
t=(l-d,l) "%(T(x).B(x),l-d,l)". And yet, since the statisti­
cal statement in question is not (by hypothesis) in r, we 
will not have r t=(l-d,l) "T(a)". This illustrates two 
things: that we must distinguish between evidence for a 
probabilistically inferred conclusion, and the conclusion 
itself (we must not just add the inductively inferred con­
clusion to r ); and the deployment of statistical evidence 
(in the sense of samples drawn) in uncertain inference 
must be indirect. Finally, R.4. constitutes a rejection of 
the very non-monotonicity we seek to model through 
probabilistic inference; we wouldn't want R.4. to hold. 
It might be asked why we relate acceptability (or probabil­
ity) to the mere number of models in which a statement is 
true. Why not wei ght the models, as, in effect, both 
Bacchus and Halpern suggest? The basic answer is that at 
some point you either introduce a subjective measure, or 
you introduce some method of counting. Halpern intro­
duces a measure on possible worlds (or models) for the 
sake of generality; Bacchus introduces a weighting on the 
objects in the domain to account for the fact that in a 
Bayesian assignment of probability it may not be the case 
that every object in D gets the same chance of being se­
lected.? But we are not talking of 'selecting' objects from 
D, nor are we seeking generality. We are seeking objec­
tivity, and we therefore would prefer to replace subjective 
'weighting' with objective 'counting.' This means that 
we do not regard individual objects in the domain D as be­
ing 'chosen', as though they could be chosen many times, 
and each might be chosen equally often (or not equally of­
ten) in the long run. If something is chosen, and that is 
relevant to our assessments of probability, then D should 
contain, not objects, but choices of objects, each of which 
in turn should be counted once . Thus the argument in 
favor of counting as opposed to weighting is that if we 
have some objective measure, and if it disagrees with the 
weighting that seems appropriate, we can achieve a match 
by altering the objects that are counted, for example from 
kinds of physical objects to trials of a chance set-up. 
In the interest of both objectivity and computability, we 
claim that the semantic condition of at-least-(1-o)-of-the­
models captures what we want to capture for probabilistic 
or inductive inference. 
15 CONCLUSION 
Insofar as there is a sense to be found for 'probabilistic 
argument' in ordinary language, it is a form of argument 
in which the conclusion, while not entailed by the 
7 In our systems this is accounted for by adopting a 
more general notion of 'object' which may be construed 
as a trial of a certain sort. 
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premises, achieves such a high degree of certainty that its 
acceptance is justified: "Our premises justify the 
acceptance of S." It is not a form of argument in which 
the conclusion has the form of a probability statement "S 
is, relative to our premises, highly probable." 
The idea of calling such argument 'probabilistic' is that it 
is high probability that warrants the acceptance of 
conclusions of this son of argument. High probability, 
however, has the problem that it leads to the acceptance of 
inconsistent conclusions, as shown by the lottery paradox 
(Kyburg, 1961). Furthermore, treatments of acceptance 
by vinue of high probability have been syntactic in 
character. What we have attempted here is to give a 
semantics for probabilistic inference. But if there is a 
semantic relation that validates probabilistic inference, it 
is also a relation that characterizes propositional 
probability generally. We have therefore attempted to 
sketch a semantics (incomplete) for the relation t=(p,q). of 
which the relation warranting acceptance at level l-8 , 
t=(l-(),q) , is a special case. 
The results of this semantic analysis are that truth in most 
models (most selected models) provides an intuitive 
warrant for the syntactic relation of high probability 
relative to premises as a ground for credence, that truth in 
most models is a reasonable ground for acceptance (with 
'most' defined in terms of I - o), and that the 
awkwardness of inconsistent databases need not make 
difficulty for probabilistic inference thus construed. It 
remains to be shown that the relation of high probability 
relative to a database is more efficiently computed than the 
relation of entailment by the database (assuming that it's 
so!). 
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